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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between per capita income and foreign aid for a panel 
of 131 (alternatively 52) recipient countries over the period 1960 to 2006 by employing annual data 
and 5-year averages. Reliance on standard panel estimation techniques, such as 2-ways FE 
estimation, panel GMM and SUR estimation, points to some pitfalls (impossibility of possible 
cointegration between aid and growth, autocorrelation of the error terms, endogeneity of the 
variables) that must be dealt with panel time series techniques (such as panel unit root test, panel 
cointegration tests and panel dynamic feasible generalized least squares estimation (DFGLS)). 
Estimations with DFGLS show that aid has an insignificant or a minute negative significant impact 
on per capita income. This result holds for countries with above- and below-average aid-to-GDP 
ratios, for countries with different levels of human development, with different income levels and 
from different regions of the world. It can be shown that by not controlling for autocorrelation, one 
erroneously attributes to aid a larger, significant negative impact on per capita income. We also find 
that aid has a significant positive (even though) small impact on investment, but a negative and 
significant impact on domestic savings (crowding out) and the real exchange rate (appreciation).  
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1. Introduction 
For a new paper investigating the impact of aid on economic growth, it may be good practice to 
begin with an apology for adding to such an immense literature. However, there is still heated 
debate on whether or not foreign aid is effective in promoting economic development in aid-
recipient countries. According to Sen (2006) and Tarp (2006), Easterly’s (2006) claim that aid has 
done “so much ill and so little good” obscures that aid can work if done right. Even recent surveys 
of the literature on the aid-growth nexus come to sharply opposing conclusions. While 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008a and 2008b) conclude that the aid effectiveness literature has 
failed to establish that aid works, McGillivray et al. (2005) stress that practically all research 
published since the late 1990s finds exactly that. 
Rather than looking at the unconditional average effect of aid, the recent literature has tried to 
establish that aid works under certain conditions only. Starting with Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
various scholars have argued that aid is indeed effective in “good” policy environments. Daalgard et 
al. (2004) focus on the recipient country’s geography, rather than its policies. Hansen and Tarp 
(2004) argue that aid is effective up to a certain amount of aid, after which the marginal effect 
becomes negative. Still others claim that aid has to be decomposed rather then investigated in total. 
Dreher et al. (2008a) look at sectoral aid rather than looking at aggregates and investigate how aid 
given for education affects educational outcomes. It has also been argued that some donors might be 
more effective in promoting growth than others, e.g., because their aid is not given for strategic or 
commercial reasons.
1 Results might even depend on the specifics of how aid flows are measured.
2 
                                                 
1 For the United States and Japan, geopolitical and commercial interests seem to be the most important determinants of 
aid, respectively (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Berthélemy (2006) finds that “all donors are not the same” with respect to 
various indicators of recipient need as well as donor interests. Multilateral institutions seem to generally pay greater 
attention to recipient needs than bilateral donors do (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Dollar 2000). Canavire et 
al. (2006) find no indication that donor countries were able to push through their individual trade and political interests 
at the multilateral level. However, various other studies suggest that multilateral institutions are also not invulnerable to 
donor pressure (Weck-Hannemann and Schneider 1981; Frey and Schneider 1986; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Kilby 2006; 
Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009, 2010; Dreher and Jensen 2007). 
2 See, e.g., the discussion in Clemens et al. (2004) concerning effective development assistance vs. official development 
assistance. 3 
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) investigate all those suggestions in one common framework 
revisiting the cross-section and the panel evidence. According to their results, it is difficult to 
discern any systematic effect of aid on growth. This finding holds across time horizons, time 
periods, cross-section and panel contexts, types of aid distinguished by what it is used for, who 
gives it, who it is given to and how long it takes to have a potential effect (contemporaneous versus 
lagged aid).  
While these studies are clearly important and innovative, they all rely on a similar econometric 
framework. As we will argue below, this framework has some limitations to analyze the question at 
hand. As one major drawback, the existing empirical literature keeps on looking at growth 
relationships that cannot be cointegrated (cannot reflect a long-run equilibrium) by any means. The 
existence of a long-run relation between economic growth, which is generally stationary, and 
population growth, technology growth, savings, investment and aid, which are generally non-
stationary, must be ruled out from a  statistical and  econometric point of view.  
A second drawback, linked to the problem of non-stationarity, is the problem of autocorrelation of 
the disturbances that can be dealt with by some type of feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimation. A third problem inter-linked with autocorrelation is the problem of omitted-variable bias 
that can be tackled in various ways, e.g., by auxiliary variables or so-called concomitants (Swamy 
and Chang, 2002) to obtain consistent estimators. Amazingly, both problems have not adequately 
been treated in the existing aid-growth literature so far (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).
3 Averaging 
data over time and the application of time dummies are often thought to be suitable to eradicate the 
autocorrelation of the error terms and cross-section dummies are utilized to capture time-invariant 
cross-section characteristics (sample heterogeneity).  
A fourth and major flaw of the existing empirical literature is the way it treats the likely 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. At times all right hand side variables are treated as 
exogenous, at other times endogeneity is taken care of by (internal or external) instruments. 
                                                 
3 Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) raise the issue of autocorrelation and Roodman (2007a) points to autocorrelation in 
several studies. 4 
 
However, utilization of lagged variables as instruments (as it is standard in the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) procedure) becomes doubtful if series and error terms show signs of 
persistence (autocorrelation) as endogeneity will not disappear by mere replacement of the 
endogenous variable by its lagged value. At other instances the instruments are very weak, e.g., if 
they are insufficiently correlated with the endogenous variables or still strongly correlated with the 
error term (Roodman, 2007a).  
It is to these four methodological issues that our paper contributes. While arguably being less fancy 
than other models (we employ a parsimonious growth model without the invention of a new 
interaction term or a new category of aid on which to focus), we will concentrate on some of the 
neglected  issues, such as existence of a long-run relationship between aid and income, control for 
autocorrelation and omitted variables, elimination of endogeneity and the estimation of a short-to- 
medium run model. With panel time series data at hand that stretch over a long period of time, 
dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) or dynamic feasible generalized least squares (DFGLS) 
could be  the methods of choice for treating endogeneity (Stock and Watson, 1993). The application 
of the GMM procedure could be another option to “exogenize” variables but this technique requires 
averaging the data over time (utilizing 5-year averages) to avoid an explosion of instruments in our 
case. Surprisingly, these techniques have only been applied to the problem at hand without due 
control of autocorrelation. Moreover, if a long-run aid-income relationship cannot be established 
with some certainty, we will then estimate the indirect effects of aid in a long-run model and set-up 
a short-to-medium term autoregressive (ARMAX-model) to quantify the short- and medium term 
impact of aid. In all applications, we will utilize an improved measure of Net ODA, which is called 
Net Aid Transfers (NAT) and which has been computed by David Roodman (Roodman, 2008). 
As to the results regarding the long-run relationship between aid and per capita income, we find that 
aid has mostly an insignificant impact on the level of real GDP per capita in our long-run Solow-
type growth model. However, the search for a long-run relationship in the aid-income context has 
not been easy and the results have not been clear-cut. We have obtained mixed and contradicting 5 
 
signals applying various cointegration tests. These inconclusive results seem to be perfectly in line 
with the insignificant long-run aid coefficient that we obtained by applying DFGLS. In addition, it 
has to be pointed out that the other explanatory variables of the Solow-type model (internal and 
external savings, population growth and technological change) have all passed the cointegration 
tests with clear, unanimous results implying a long-run equilibrium with real per capita income. We 
therefore conclude that aid has not been  part of the cointegrating (long-run) relationship.   
Investigating possible long-run transmission channels (indirect links) between aid and per capita 
income, we can observe that the impact of aid on investment is positive, but very small. Its impact 
on the domestic savings-GDP ratio is quite small but negative, which indicates some crowding out 
of domestic savings. Furthermore, we find that capital inflows (aid being one component of it) lead 
to a slight appreciation of the real exchange rate in the long run. This finding together with the very 
small positive impact on investment and a small crowding out effect with respect to domestic 
savings might result in an insignificant impact on the level of real per capita GDP in the long run. 
As to reverse causality between aid and per capita income, we find that on the one hand aid Granger 
causes the level of real per capita GDP in the short run (the impact is positive but very small!) 
together with population growth, internal and external saving, which have a long-run impact on aid. 
On the other hand, per capita income does not Granger cause aid at conventional error levels in the 
short term and the relationship is therefore uni-directional going from aid to income. This finding 
leads us to look for a short-to-medium run relationship between aid and real per capita income. 
Contrary to what is argued in much of the recent literature, we also find that the impact of aid on 
real per capita income is linear. The non-linear model has been rejected. 
The outline of the study is as follows. After reporting the related literature in Section 2 the 
empirical growth model will be motivated and derived in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. In Section 5 the results will be evaluated from an economic policy and an econometric 
point of view. 6 
 
 
2. Review of related literature and points of concern 
In recent decades a multitude of studies has evolved that examine the effectiveness of aid in terms 
of increases in real per capita GDP or growth and studies that analyze the effectiveness of aid in 
terms of reaching the Millennium Development goals (MDGs). While we think that reducing 
poverty and hunger, child mortality, overcoming HIV and malaria, improving gender equality, 
literacy and so forth are extremely important objectives of giving aid, the “older” question of 
whether we can increase per capita income and enable a self-sustaining growth process in recipient 
countries is equally important from a development economics point of view. Morrissey (2001), 
Hansen and Tarp (2001), Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), and Pattillo et al. 
(2007) concentrate on studying the effectiveness of aid in terms of promoting real GDP growth in 
recipient countries and get mixed results. Morrissey (2001), Reddy and Minoiu (2006) and Minoiu 
and Reddy (2007) point to a positive growth effect of developmental aid even independent of the 
quality of economic policies in recipient countries. The famous results by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) suggested that aid promoted growth only in an environment of ‘good policies’. Following 
Burnside and Dollar, most of the research has focused on the importance (or lack) of certain 
conditions in the recipient country. The “good policy” model, in which aid is effective only when 
the recipient country government already pursues growth-promoting policies, has been very 
influential in shaping aid allocation procedures of major multilateral development agencies and 
bilateral donors. Related research considers the effectiveness of aid to be dependent on certain 
features of recipient countries such as the share of a country’s area that lies in the tropics (Daalgard 
et al., 2004), the level of democratization (Svensson, 1999), institutional quality (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2004), political stability (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004), vulnerability to external shocks 
(Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001) and absorptive capacity (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004). 
However, Easterly et al. (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) showed that the results were 
very fragile, being sensitive to small changes in the data set or in the model specification.  7 
 
Other empirical studies have even pointed to a questionable or negative growth effect of aid in the 
long run (Svensson, 1999; Ovaska, 2003). Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008a and 2008b) conclude 
that the aid effectiveness literature has failed to establish that aid works. The insignificant long-run 
effect is said to be due to weak institutions, increased corruption and a dwindling willingness to 
raise taxes (Knack, 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007) and/or to real exchange-rate appreciation 
(Rajan and Subramanian, 2005b) in the recipient economies. It is argued that real exchange rate 
overvaluation, which eventually harms exports and the import-substitution sectors, is brought about 
by the aid inflow which affects the capital account under both flexible and fixed exchange rate 
systems. Next to the effect on the exchange rate, the impact of aid on investment has to be clarified. 
It is relatively unclear whether aid increases investment (overall investment; i.e., public and private 
investment), whether it crowds out domestic investment or whether it is primarily consumed.  
An intermediate perspective is taken in the so-called “medicine” model (Jensen and Paldam 2006) 
that sees some levels of aid as growth-promoting regardless of recipient government policies. 
However, at higher levels of aid, the marginal effect on growth becomes negative so that aid is less 
effective, or even harmful. 
Even though donors surely would want aid to be effective in furthering exports, growth and human 
development in recipient countries, ineffectiveness of aid is apparently not a sufficient condition for 
donors to refuse aid. Studies on aid allocation have shown that historical ties, political and strategic 
interests of donor countries, as well as incentive structures within the donor community and its 
agencies are also very important factors in determining aid flows and can easily ensure aid flows 
even in the absence of effectiveness (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Mosley, Harrington, and Toye, 
1990; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007).   
It is often argued that the motivation with which aid is given (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008b, 
2009, 2010) and the type of aid given (Clemens et al., 2004; Reddy and Minoiu, 2006) have an 
impact on the effectiveness of aid.  8 
 
Likewise, it has been argued that aid given for different sectors of an economy
4 might have a 
different impact on per capita income (Clemens et al., 2004). On top of that, there might exist a 
“macro-micro paradox” of aid. Many aid-funded projects report positive micro-level returns that are 
undetectable at the macro-level (Boone, 1994). 
Also while it is clear that the short-run impact of aid on growth may differ from its long-run impact 
(Clemens et al., 2004), that aid may impact positively or negatively in the short run depending on 
the project or its macroeconomic side effects (Roodman, 2007a), from an economic policy point of 
view the analysis of the long-term aid-growth relationship should be given priority. This involves 
observation of the aid-growth nexus over a long time horizon (1960-2006). In our analysis we will 
work with aggregate data as we are interested in studying the aid-per capita income relationship 
over the long-run in a complex environment of institutions, motivations, and organizational 
abilities. Given that data on the latter will not be available for the whole sample period and all the 
recipient countries under study, we are confronted with an “omitted variables” problem. 
We will address the problem of “omitted variables,”
5 which is more pressing in our type of 
approach than in a cross-section analysis, in two ways: first, we will insert country fixed effects and 
second, we will correct for autocorrelation with due caution. Under the condition that omitted 
variables cannot be quantified and must therefore be relegated to the error term (!), the correction of 
autocorrelation via Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) or a similar method also helps to 
moderate the omitted variable problem. Whereas the country fixed effects capture omitted country 
characteristics that are time-invariant, taking out the “swings of the error terms” will also absorb 
unobservable or unquantifiable country characteristics that might vary over time (changing attitudes 
towards corruption, rent-seeking, inequality, poverty, and law enforcement; improvement of 
administrative efficiency; progress in efficiency in handling projects, changing organizational and 
managerial capabilities). 
                                                 
4 Michaelowa and Weber (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008a) look at whether aid for education raises primary enrollment 
rates. Mishra and Newhouse (2007) study the relationship between health aid and infant mortality. 
5 The omitted variable problem is more pressing in our type of approach as it will be very difficult to get coherent series 
on institutional quality, rent-seeking, corruption or organizational aspect of aid over the period 1960-2006. 9 
 
 
3. Empirical growth model: Linking aid and per capita income, but not aid and growth 
Following Cellini (1997) we apply a parsimonious Solow-type model based on non-stationary 
( ) 1 ( I )-variables with a stochastic steady state. We relegate time-varying unobservable or 
unquantifiable country characteristics (of the above-mentioned type) into the error term ( t i u e , ). In 
contrast to Cellini’s model, our model reflects an open economy that allows for external financing. 
It is assumed that external savings are used to finance at least partly domestic investment. The 
capital stock in the recipient country’s economy (the domestic capital stock) can be either 
domestically financed (by domestic savings (private+public), externally financed (without a grant 
element; by net external savings=external savings minus foreign aid or externally financed by Net 
Official Development Aid (ODA)) or Net Aid Transfers (NAT). NAT is our preferred measure of 
ODA for the reasons given above. The domestic capital stock then consists of domestically financed 
physical capital (K1), externally financed physical capital following market conditions (K2) and 
externally financed physical capital involving a grant element (K3) 
K= K1+K2+K3                                                                                                                             (1) 
The output equation that assumes constant returns to scale then reads as follows 
t i u
t i t i t i t i t i t i e L A K K K Y , 3 2 1 3 2 1 1
, , , 3 , 2 , 1 , ) ( ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = − − − α α α α α α                                                                (2) 
 
where  3 , 2 , 1 α α α  are technology parameters; subscripts iand  t indicate country and time, 
respectively;  t i u e ,  is the error term; L is labor,  2 1, K K  and  3 K are physical capital financed by 
three different sources, while  A indicates the technology level, which is the same across countries 
at date t.  
2 1,K K and  3 K grow according to the following equations 
1 , ,
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t i δ − =                                                                                                       (5) 
Where  sdomsy  is the domestic savings-to-GDP ratio, sextnyis equal to  snaty sexty− = , which is 
the external savings-to-GDP ratio minus external savings in the form of aid (NAT  ) (snaty ; δ  is the 
depreciation rate, which is assumed to be the same for all three types of capital and to be constant 
across countries and over time. The rate of technological progress g , is also constant and such that: 
gt
i t i e A A 0 , , =                                                                                                                            (6) 
And the growth of labor force is denoted by  t i n , , so that 
t i n
i t i e L L ,
0 , , =                                                                                                                           (7) 
A constant steady state level can be derived for 
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(11) 
where the variables k and y are in efficiency units, and stars indicate steady state variables. 
The steady state per capita income  * y  varies according to the following stochastic equation: 11 
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(12) 
In the neighborhood of the steady state path, per capita income growth evolves according to the 
following equation  
t i t i t i t i
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……………………………………………………………………………                           (13) 
where  − ⋅ + + = 1 ( ) ( , , δ λ g n t i t i 3 2 1 α α α − − ), which is the speed of convergence. It is not constant 
due to the variability of the employment rate (population growth rate). In theory, g and δ  could 
also vary over time. 
Note that Eq. (12) explains the level of real per capita income in the long-run, whereas Eq. (13) 
describes the determinants of per capita income growth. A long-run equilibrium or a long-run 
relationship between growth and the level of real per capita income and its determinants requires all 
variables to be non-stationary (e.g. I(1)). Looking at Appendix A1 it becomes clear that in eq. (13) 
growth is I(0) and can therefore not be determined by variables that are I(1), which are 
characterized by larger upward and downward movements. In visualized form the relationship 
between growth and aid  does not show a clear  upward or downward-sloping regression line for the 
period 1960-2006 in our sample of recipient countries (see Appendix A2). The correlation 
coefficient between aid and growth is about -7.8 % and the correlation coefficient between aid and 
growth controlling for domestic savings and other factors is around +0.6%, pointing to insufficient 
correlation which would express itself by a very low R
2 (around 13%) when estimating a 
regression. Therefore we must conclude that eq. (13), i.e. the aid –growth relationship, is not 
amenable to econometric treatment. 12 
 
For statistical reasons, only eq. (12), the aid-per capita income relationship, can be estimated with 
econometric techniques, all regression variables being  I(1)). Non-stationarity of the series implies 
that real per capita income could potentially be in a long-run relationship with domestic and 
external savings and aid. This, however, will be more closely investigated by panel cointegration 
tests in section 4.3. 
 Eq. (12) is estimated in a simplified form (see Eq. (14)). 
 
t i t i t i t i t i i t i u LPOPGPLUS b LSNATY b LSEXTNY b LSDOMY b b LRYPOP , , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , + + + + + =                  (14) 
                                                                                                                                             
where all variables are in natural logs;  
subscripts iand t indicate country and time, respectively 
t i LRYPOP,  = real per capita income  
t i LSDOMY ,  = domestic savings-to-GDP ratio  
t i LSEXTNY ,  = external savings minus aid-to-GDP ratio  
t i LPOPGPLUS ,  = population growth + 5% (includes technological progress and capital 
depreciation
6) 
t i u ,  = all unobservable and unquantifiable variables that impact on per capita income and that vary 
over countries and over time. 
 
The data of LRYPOP, LSDOMY, LSEXTNY and LPOPGPLUS are taken and compiled from the 
World Development Indicators 2008 CD-ROM.  t i LSNATY ,  = net aid transfers-to-GDP ratio (in 
                                                 
6 Sum of the growth rate of technology and the rate of capital depreciation are assumed to be equal to 5 percent 
(following Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992, p. 413). 13 
 
logs). NAT is available from the Center for Global Development.
7 It has been computed by 
Roodman (2008) and embodies two modifications of Net ODA (from the DAC committee of the 
OECD). First, it substracts interest payments received from developing countries on outstanding aid 
loans, which are now treated as capital outflows just as principal payments. Second, NAT takes out 
debt relief. The cancellation of old non-aid loans (in the form of export credits or loans with too 
high interest rates) boosted Net ODA and is therefore removed in NAT. 
8 
 
4. The aid-per capita income link: Empirical findings 
4.1. Applying regular panel data estimation techniques 
This section follows the panel data approach where emphasis is often put on the “within” 
estimation, i.e. an exploitation of the variation of the variables over time. Studies of this type are 
frequently performed to present an overview of what happened in the 1960-2006 period on average 
in the developing world when it received aid.  
We use a panel of 131 countries, utilize annual and averaged data (5-year averages; to smooth the 
data over time) and then estimate Eq. (14) in various ways: with fixed effects, time-effects, 
controlling for autocorrelation, panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR). In addition, we will discuss the inclusion of time effects to control for 
events that vary over time but are the same in all cross-sections, leading to a  2-ways fixed effects 
estimation and the problem of finding adequate instruments.  
                                                 
7 See http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492 (February 20, 2009). 





Table 1. The income-aid relationship: Dependent variable: real per capita income (LRYPOP); 
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(IV) 










no yes  yes  via 
SUR 
R
2  adj.  0.99 0.99 0.86 ___  ___  ___ 
DW-stat. 0.21  0.77  2.48  ___  ___ ___ 
Note: t-values in parentheses. The 2-ways-FE-estimation relies on cross-section fixed effects and time effects. The 
FE+FGLS estimation utilizes cross-section fixed (country fixed effects) and corrects for autocorrelation of the error 
terms. Panel GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) is applied to the sample with 5-year averages to limit the number 15 
 
of moment conditions. Due to autocorrelation of the disturbances the instruments (lagged values of the variables) 
become invalid.  
 
 
As we can see from Table 1, the two-ways fixed effects estimation (columns 2 and 3) remains 
subject to autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson statistic being 0.21 and 0.77. In columns 4 and 5 the 
equation has been estimated via Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) to purge the error term 
from autocorrelation. By doing so, the impact of domestic and external savings and of aid on per 
capita income has been reduced compared to the 2-ways-FE estimation. The FGLS-results point to 
a minute negative impact of aid on per capita income. The Durbin-Watson statistic improves and 
moves closer towards two (the DW-statistic being 1.64 and 2.48). The application of the panel 
GMM estimation technique (column 6) is only possible when we work with 5-year averages
9 or 10-
year averages. If we utilized annual data, we would create 4324 (47*46*4/2) moment conditions. A 
potential “plus” of GMM is that it works in dynamic models and can handle endogenous variables, 
if autocorrelation of the error terms is absent.
10 The results are presented in column 5. We control 
for autocorrelation in a first step and then apply GMM (results are presented in column 6). Running 
this GMM, we obtain an insignificant impact of aid on per capita income. As to the SUR estimation 
(column 7), this estimation method will not be feasible if we work with yearly data.
11 Therefore, we 
follow Alesina et al. (2003) and work with 5-year averages, to set up a system of equations and to 
switch cross-section and periods when the number of cross-sections is large and the number of time 
periods is small. In our case, this implies that separate equations are utilized for the 60-64, 65-69, 
70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-94, 95-99, 00-06. Following this estimation procedure, we basically 
estimate nine cross-section equations (with 131 countries in each equation) in the system. By 
switching cross-sections and time-periods the estimation becomes a “between” estimation and 
autocorrelation over time is controlled for by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)-
technique. Also in the SUR estimation the impact of aid on per capita income is insignificant. 
                                                 
9 Working with 5-year averages we have already created 144 moment conditions. 
10 Due to lack of control for autocorrelation in the xtabond2 procedure in STATA, we do not use this procedure. 
11 A system of 48 equations cannot be estimated with the computer programs at hand. 16 
 
However, a further finding – given our data – is that averaging over time does not (and cannot) 
eradicate autocorrelation, as it has often been suggested in the literature since autocorrelation 
between time-intervals persists. On top of that, we give up a lot of information on the behavior of 
the variables over time by strongly averaging the data over time and/or working with time effects. 
We would therefore vote against averaging data over time and against employing time fixed effects. 
 
4.2 Dealing with possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables 
So far we have dealt with endogeneity only in the GMM procedure. However, GMM can only be 
utilized if the number of observations over time is small or kept small by averaging data over 
time.
12 In the GMM procedure all explanatory variables of the model are replaced by instruments 
(either the lagged values of the variables in levels or the lagged values of the variables in 
differences); autocorrelation of the error terms must be ruled out in the xtabond2 procedure of 
STATA which led us to run an autocorrelation-corrected version of it. Another option is the 
instrumental variable technique utilizing Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) to get rid of 
endogeneity; either lagged values of the endogenous variables in question (not applicable in the 
presence of autocorrelation) or external instruments can be utilized (this is extremely difficult and 
not always advisable; see Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a, 2008). A third option are the dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS) and the dynamic feasible generalized least squares technique 
(DFGLS if autocorrelation must be taken care of) which can be utilized if the time series are long 
enough; endogeneity is controlled for by using numerous leads and lags of the variables in 
differences that absorb the effect of the correlation with the error term (Stock and Watson, 1993). 
However, when utilizing DOLS and DFGLS the variables must be linked to each other in the long 
run (they must be cointegrated, i.e. in a long-run equilibrium).
13 DFGLS has an advantage over 
DOLS since it controls for spuriousness in the regression due to autocorrelation. We therefore have 
                                                 
12 In our case this requires averaging the data over time. 
13 To avoid spurious regression results, we estimated the relationship between aid and real per capita income (and not 
growth) in the previous section. 17 
 
to test for these properties before we can estimate the aid-per capita income relationship via 
DOLS/DFGLS. Note that unit-root and cointegration tests require long coherent time spans so that 
the sample size must be reduced to 52 countries. 
 
4.3. Existence of a long-run equilibrium between aid and per capita income (52 country 
sample): mixed evidence 
In Appendix Table A1 we find that per capita income growth is stationary (I(0)) and that real per 
capita income, population growth + technological progress + capital depreciation (LPOPGPLUS ), 
the domestic savings-to-GDP ratio (LSDOMY), the net external savings-to-GDP ratio (LSEXTNY) 
and the net aid transfer-to-GDP measure (LSNATY) (all in logs) are (I(1). In visual terms we 
observe that growth rates of real per capita income show, in general, very little persistence over 
time (they are stationary series, I(0))), whereas the aid-to-GDP ratio and the level of real per 
capita income and the other covariates exhibit large and persistent movements with strong positive 
trends for most developing countries since 1960 (they are non-stationary series, I(1)). The 
empirical implication of this fact is that there can be a long-run relationship between the level of per 
capita output and the level of the aid-to-GDP ratio over time, but there cannot be a long-run 
relationship between the growth rate of per capita output and the level of the aid-to-GDP ratio over 
time  (Herzer, 2008). Cointegration between a dependent I(0)-variable and independent (I(1))-
variables must be ruled out for statistical reasons since a long-run statistical correlation between I(0) 
and I(1)-variables is impossible. Consequently, panels with stationary and non-stationary variables 
can, even in cross-country growth analyses, lead to misleading results (see, e.g., Ericsson et al., 
2001).  
We investigate the long-run relationship between aid and per capita income by first testing for 
cointegration between aid, its covariates and per capita income, which are all I(1)-variables. Various 
cointegration tests are applied (Johansen, 1988; Kao, 1999; Pedroni, 1999, 2004). However, 
cointegrations tests can be problematic themselves. Gregory et al. (2004) emphasize the instability 18 
 
of cointegration tests, i.e. a relatively high test statistic for one test and a relatively low test statistic 
for another, for time series cointegration tests. This effect is particularly strong when comparing 
residual and system-based tests. This finding is confirmed by Hanck (2006) who compares 
cointegration test results by means of p-values in panel data settings. In panel data cointegration 
tests this problem is exacerbated by cross-sections which might cover different spans of time. In our 
case Pedroni’s, Kao’s and Johansen’s cointegration tests deliver contradicting results.  Kao’s and 
Johansen’s cointegration test signal the existence of cointegration (even though Johansen signals 
several cointegrating vectors) whereas Pedroni’s cointegration test rejects the existence of a long-
run relationship between LYRPOP and LPOPGPLUS, LSDOMY, LSEXTNY and LSNATY.
14 
To recall, cointegration would imply that the augmented Solow model (Eq. (14)) holds in the long 
run and that aid helps to determine real per capita income in the long run. However, the finding of 
‘no cointegration’ does neither preclude the existence of a long-run relationship in which aid does 
not play a role nor the existence of a short-to-medium run relationship between the level of per 
capita income and the explanatory variables (including aid).  
In case of a long-run relationship we can formulate a long-run model. If the estimates show an 
insignificant impact of aid on per capita income in the long run, this can be taken as evidence of no 
cointegration between aid and per capita income. Therefore, we consider the estimation of the long-
run relationship as a further test of cointegration. 
 
4.4. Estimation of the long-run aid-per capita income relationship via DOLS/DFGLS 
According to Stock and Watson (1993), both the DOLS and the DFGLS procedure generate 
unbiased estimates for variables that cointegrate, even with endogenous regressors. They do so by 
employing leads and lags of the variables in differences that absorb changes in the variables caused 
by changes in the disturbances if both are correlated. 
                                                 
14 Hjalmarsson and Österholm (2007) propose a more robust residual-based cointegration test for near unit root 
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                                                                                                                                                (15) 
can be estimated by a dynamic ordinary least squares technique (DOLS) if autocorrelation of the 
disturbances is absent (which is not the case in our study). To correct for autocorrelation of the 
disturbances we utilize Dynamic Feasible Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS). The same way as 
one would apply FGLS when OLS is inefficient due to autocorrelation by pre-estimating the extent 
of autocorrelation of the residuals ρ ˆ , one can apply DFGLS when DOLS is inefficient due to 
autocorrelation (see Stock and Watson, 1993).  
DFGLS requires a transformation of the original variables as outlined in the Technical Appendix 
below. 
 













Independent variables  Dependent variable: 









LPOPGPLUS  -1.20***  (-9.23)  -0.003 (-0.02) 
LSDOMY  0.21***  (13.13)  0.07***(5.56) 20 
 
LSEXTNY  0.11***  (7.29)  0.05***(4.79) 
LSNATY  -0.13***  (-10.25)   -0.02 (-1.47) 
Fixed effects  yes  yes 
2 leads and 2 lags  yes  yes 
Cross-sections included  52  50 
R-squared adj.  0.99  0.99 
Durbin-Watson stat.  0.15  2.02 
t-values in parentheses. 
As can be seen from column (2), the regression results of the DOLS estimation are subject to 
autocorrelation. They will not be discussed. The DFGLS results show an insignificant impact of the 
aid-to-GDP ratio on real per capita income. This result seems to be in line with the “mixed” results 
of the cointegration tests which pointed to cointegration (twice) and no cointegration (once) 
depending on the cointegration test applied. Interpreting the significant coefficients of the DFGLS 
estimation (column (3)), we can conclude that a doubling of the domestic savings-to-GDP ratio 
would increase per capita income by 7% and a doubling of the net capital inflows (minus aid)-to-
GDP ratio would increase per capita income by 5% (α being 1%). In column 3 autocorrelation is 
controlled for, the DW-statistic being 2.02.  
 
4.5 The impact of aid on income in different sub-samples 
Considering countries with different aid-to-GDP ratios (Table 3) and only interpreting the DFGLS 
results which have validity, we observe that a higher aid-to-GDP ratio has a slightly negative 
impact (-0.03) in the recipient countries with a high aid-to-GDP ratio and an insignificant impact in 
those developing countries that have a low aid-to-GDP ratio. Of course, one could argue that aid-to-
GDP ratios in the countries with above-average aid-to-GDP ratios might not yet have been 
sufficient to generate positive income effects. This, however, is beyond the conclusions one can 
draw with the data at hand. Again, correction for autocorrelation strongly reduces aid’s negative 




Table 3: Different impact depending on the aid-to-GDP ratio? DOLS versus DFGLS 
estimation 
  Above-average aid-to-GDP ratio 
countries 
 
Below-average aid-to-GDP ratio 
countries 
 















LPOPGPLUS  0.98***(5.02)  0.04  (0.23)  -2.06***(-12.49) 0.37   (1.31) 
LSDOMY  0.12***(8.67) 0.05***(3.87) 0.39***(11.77)  0.16***(5.37) 
LSEXTNY  0.08***(4.28) 0.04**(2.29)  0.16***  (8.26) 0.06***(4.32) 
LSNATY  -0.16***(-8.95)  -0.03* (-1.70)  -0.10*** (-5.63)  -0.01   (-0.78) 
Fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
2 leads and 2 
lags 
yes yes yes yes 
Cross-sections 
included 
23 23 29 29 
R-squared adj.  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Durbin-Watson 
stat. 
0.19 2.27 0.20 1.99 
t-values in parentheses. 
 
To see whether the aid-per capita income link depends on other influencing factors that are linked to 
a country’s human development, economic development or regional affiliation, we estimated the 
long-run relationship for different sub-categories of the above-mentioned characteristics. 
Again when controlling for autocorrelation, the impact of aid on per capita income becomes 
insignificant (see Tables 4, 5 and 6; DOLS-results are available upon request). These findings 
support the result of no cointegration (no long-run link between aid and per capita income). 
The aid and per capita income relationship in different subsamples of developing countries 
 22 
 
Table 4: Different impact depending on the level of human development? DFGLS estimation 
 
  Dependent variable: LRYPOP (log of real per capita income); 















(HDI 0.800 and 
above) 
 
LPOPGPLUS  -0.53 (-1.47)     0.43* (1.69)   0.68 (0.06) 
LSDOMY   0.06*** (3.53)   0.09*** (3.46)   1.91 (0.43) 
LSEXTNY   0.02 (0.69)   0.05*** (4.08)   -1.01 (-0.30) 
LSNATY  -0.03 (-1.11)  -0.01 (-0.45)   -0.17 (-0.21) 
 
Fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
2 leads and 2 lags  yes  yes  yes 
Cross-sections 
included 
20 25 4 
R-squared adj.  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Durbin-Watson 
stat. 
1.89 2.14 1.55 
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 5: Different impact depending on the level of income? DFGLS estimation 
 
  Dependent variable: LRYPOP (log of real per capita income); 








(GNI per capita of 




(GNI per capita of 
$736-9,075 in 2002) 
LPOPGPLUS  -0.23 (-0.71)  -0.30 (-1.09)   0.23 (0.70) 
LSDOMY   0.05*** (3.37)   0.06*** (4.08)   0.18*** (4.62) 
LSEXTNY   0.08*** (3.25)   0.05*** (3.37)   0.06***   (3.99) 
LSNATY  -0.01 (-0.53)  -0.02 (-1.12)  -0.01 (-0.93) 
 
Fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
2 leads and 2 lags  yes  yes  yes 
Cross-sections 
included 
18 24 24 
R-squared adj.  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Durbin-Watson 
stat. 
2.14 1.73 2.41 
Note:  t-values in parentheses. 
 High income countries (GNI per capita of $9,076 or more in 2002) were not among our 58 developing countries. 
LLDC are defined by the United Nations. It is a socioeconomic classification considering per capita income, economic 
vulnerability and human development. 23 
 
 
 Table 6: Different impact when countries are sorted by region? DFGLS estimation 
 
  Dependent variable: LRYPOP (log of real per capita income); estimation 





























































Fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes yes 
2 leads and 2 
lags 




5  11 16 25 6 
R-squared 
adj. 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Durbin-
Watson stat. 
2.18 2.16 1.92 1.93 2.16 
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
 
In general we observe that aid has an insignificant impact on per capita income irrespective of the 
level of human development, irrespective of the level of income and irrespective of the region. 
The mixed results with respect to cointegration (together with the finding of an insignificant impact 
of aid on real per capita income in the DFGLS estimations) lead us to conclude that there is no 
long-run relationship between aid and income.
15  
 
4.6 Transmission channels from aid to per capita income (the long-run view) 
                                                 
15 This conclusion is further reinforced by a long-run Granger causality test that points to a bi-directional link between 
aid and per capita income which makes the quantification of the aid impact on income impossible (results are available 
from the authors upon request). 24 
 
Even though we found a statistically insignificant impact of aid on per capita income in the overall 
and sub-samples in the long run, aid could still affect per capita income in an indirect way. In the 
literature on the transmission channels of aid to per capita income, one is exactly concerned about 
aid’s impact on investment, on domestic savings (public and private) and on the real exchange rate 
in the long run (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a, 2005b).  
As to the transmission channels of aid to per capita income, we clearly find cointegration (all 
cointegration tests find a long-run equilibrium between aid and investment, aid and domestic 
savings and aid and the real exchange rate). Table 7 presents the strength of the above-mentioned 
transmission channels. The relationships are estimated by applying DFGLS and thus controlling for 
autocorrelation and endogeneity.  
 
Table 7. Possible transmission channels that link aid and per capita income 















Real exchange rate 
(in logs) 
LRER 
LPOPGPLUS  --- ---  --- 
LSDOMY   0.42***(19.76)  ---  --- 
LSEXTNY   0.29***(15.30)  ---  -0.14 (-0.66) 
LSNATY   0.04**(2.17)  -0.12***(-3.45)  -0.51**(-2.27) 
 
Fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
2 leads and 2 lags  yes  yes  yes 
Cross-sections 
included 
50 56  20 
R-squared adj.  0.91  0.66  0.66 
Durbin-Watson stat.  1.92  1.83  2.13 
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
The domestic savings-to-GDP ratio, the net external savings-to-GDP and the net aid transfers-to-
GDP ratio all have a positive and significant impact on recipient country’s investment. 25 
 
The domestic savings-to-GDP ratio declines with the aid-to-GDP ratio so that there is some 
crowding out and the real effective exchange rate appreciates with an increase in the aid-to GDP 
ratio. 
To sum up the results, we find that aid does not directly affect per capita income in the long run, 
while we do observe that aid has a long-run impact on per capita income via investment, domestic 
savings and the real exchange rate. Thus, aid is not directly, but indirectly linked to per capita 
income in the long-run.  
 
4.7   In search of a short- to medium-term relationship between aid and per capita income 
However, per capita income could still be determined by aid in the short-to-medium run. The short-
run Granger causality test (results are available upon request) shows that aid determines per capita 
income in the short run but not the other way around. Therefore, aid can be considered a weakly 
exogenous variable and instrumentation for aid is not necessary. Instrumentation for the other 
variables in the model might be a good idea. Concentrating on the short-to-medium run relationship 
between aid and its covariates and per capita income, we estimate an ARMAX-model 
(Autoregressive-moving average model) that explains variations in the dependent variable not only 
by its lagged values but also by additional variables, (X). Given that our observations over time are 
large (T=47) we cannot utilize GMM
16 to instrument for potentially endogenous variables.  
Searching for the specific form of the ARMAX (p,q)-model we find that the error term is a first 
order moving average process (MA1 with q=1), i.e. we observe first order autocorrelation and start 
by estimating the autoregressive process by p lags. As lags higher than p=1 are not significant at 
conventional levels, we end up estimating an ARMAX (p=1, q=1) model
17 of the following form   
                                                 
16 GMM was developed for panel data that consist of many cross-sections (large N) and few observations over time 
(small T). 
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In estimating the ARMAX-model we have three options: The first option is to estimate the model 
by two ways- fixed effects (cross-section fixed effects and time year dummies) instrumenting for 
the lagged dependent variable. Since the other explanatory variables (including aid)
18 turned out to 
be weakly exogenous, we don’t have to instrument for them. The second option is to estimate the 
model in a stepwise regression (suggesting appropriate instruments that are added at a later step) via 
FGLS, removing the moving average process of the disturbances.
19 The third option is to take 5-
year averages and to estimate the model by means of an autocorrelation-corrected GMM. 
                                                 
18 See also the Granger causality test. 
19 This is accomplished by transforming the error term and all the variables; time year dummies cannot be utilized then. 




Table 8:  Impact of aid on per capita income in the short and medium term (ARMAX-model) 
Estimation 
methods→ 
The aid-per capita 
income relationship  
(2 ways-fixed effects 
estimation) 
 
The aid-per capita 

















Real per capita income 




Real per capita income 
(in logs and 
transformed) 
 
1 , − t i LRYPOP   0.97*** (146.15)  0.99*** (50.07)  0.87***(11.23) 
t i LPOPGPLUS ,   -0.02   (-0.52)  -0.01   (-0.08)   -0.01     (-0.14) 
1 , − t i LPOPGPLUS   -0.02   (-0.77)  -0.00    (-0.04)  -0.15     (-1.10) 
t i LSDOMY ,   0.01*** (4.05)  0.01*** (4.53)  0.03**   (2.38) 
1 , − t i LSDOMY   0.00 (-0.19)  0.00       (-0.09)  0.02     (1.25)  
t i LSEXTNY ,   0.01*** (2.15)  0.01*** (2.37)  --- 
1 , − t i LSEXTNY   0.00 (-0.16)  0.00    (-1.23)  --- 
t i LSNATY ,   -0.01*** (-2.74)  -0.01*** (-2.77)  -0.03* (-1.87)   
1 , − t i LSNATY   0.01*** (3.51)  0.01***  (2.86)  0.06*** (4.40) 
Added regressors  no  3 , − t i TLRYPOP   no 
Fixed effects  yes  no  yes 
Time year dummies  yes  no  yes 
Number of 
observations 
1366 1182 461 
R-squared adj.  0.97  0.99  ___ 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
 1.98  ___ 
Note: t-values in parentheses 
 
 
We observe very similar results across the different techniques of estimation chosen. As expected, 
today’s per capita income depends on lagged per capita income and domestic and external savings 
(net of aid) increase per capita income. This year’s aid decreases per capita income and we consider 
real exchange rate appreciation responsible for this empirical finding as capital flows react faster 
than the real economy. Furthermore, last year’s aid impacts positively on per capita income as it has 




In this paper, we have shown that the direct impact of aid impact on per capita income is 
statistically insignificant or negative, but very small. This finding holds for the long-run and for the 
recipient countries in general, but also for sub-groups of recipient countries which have been 
formed according to an above-average/below-average aid-to-GDP ratio, the level of human 
development, the level of income and the region of the world. In the short and medium run the 
impact of current aid (slightly negative) and of lagged aid (slightly positive) cancel themselves out. 
From an economic policy view the negative short run impact through (presumably) real exchange 
rate appreciation could be ameliorated by building up foreign exchange reserves or other types of 
macroeconomic management. 
Furthermore, we find for the long run that aid increases investment, whereas it causes a small 
crowding out of domestic savings and leads to some appreciation of the real exchange rate. In 
contrast to external savings (net capital inflows minus aid), which obey to market conditions 
(interest rate differentials and exchange rate expectations), net aid transfers (which are grants or 
loans with a grant element) do not increase real per capita income. The rate of return of aid-financed 
projects seems to be below the interest to be paid on those loans, whereas the rate of return of 
externally-financed investment projects seems to be higher than the interest to be paid on those 
loans.  
Interestingly, we also observe that the impact of aid on per capita income gets smaller when we 
control for autocorrelation by means of FGLS. As swings of error terms around the regression line 
can be due to both pure autocorrelation (this is very likely if time series are non-stationary) and 
omitted variables (this is equally very likely if we have unobservable or unquantifiable country 
characteristics that vary over time) we eliminate both problems at the same time. Intuitively, by 
controlling for unobservable or unquantifiable country characteristics, which very likely are related 
to the reasons why aid has been granted in the first place (donors motivations and donors 
perceptions) or how aid transfers have been managed and spent in the second place (efficiency of 29 
 
bureaucracy, absence of corruption and rent-seeking, organizational, managerial and workers’ 
capabilities) the negative impact of aid on per capita income gets noticeably reduced.  
However, to see our main finding (no statistically significant long-run relationship between aid and 
real per capita income) in perspective, It has to be kept in mind that per capita income is influenced 
by a multitude of factors
20  (unfortunately they cannot be all possibly captured), aid playing only 
one part in it. In addition, given that the average amount of aid provided is quite small (on average 
5% of recipient countries’ GDP), it is reasonable to assume that at best aid will only marginally 
contribute to per capita income. This is not to say that aid cannot have important indirect effects 
(e.g. on investment). Development projects should therefore concentrate on delivering those effects 
and emphasize on infrastructure projects with many backward and forward linkages. Crowding out 
of domestic saving (the dwindling willingness of recipient countries’ governments to tax) should be 
hampered by helping developing countries set up a functioning tax system and an efficient 
administration. Some donor countries have started to send experts and provide training in exactly 
that area.The real appreciation effect linked to the inflow of aid is probably something recipient 
countries have to live with to a certain extent, but there are promising country experiences in which 
real exchange rate appreciation could be attenuated by a successful macroeconomic management of 
aid flows.
21 In addition, a positive aspect of a real exchange rate appreciation can be found in a 
strengthening of the service sectors (resources are allocated away from tradables to non-tradables), 
such as the provision of water, electricity, oil and gas, health services, education and public 
transport.   
 
                                                 
20 Not controlling for these factors leads to inconsistent parameter estimates (over- or under-estimation of parameter 
values). Even though cross-section analyses suffer less from finding a certain piece of information on a certain country 
characteristic for a certain period of time, they are unable to solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in general. 
Much better mechanisms of intervention (tackling the omitted variables problem, dealing with endogeneity) exist when 
performing panel analyses which stretch over long time periods.  
 
21 See Aiyar et al. (2008). 30 
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Table A1.   Results of the ADF-Fisher panel unit root test 
Variable tested  Fisher statistic  Probability  Variable is 
integrated 
LRYPOP ∆   
(growth of per capita income) 
226.91 0.00  I(0) 
LRYPOP 
(per capita income (in levels)) 
 82.73  0.99  ) 1 ( I  
LPOPGPLUS   
(population growth, technological 
change and capital depreciation 
rate) 
104.20 0.78  ) 1 ( I  
LSDOMY      (domestic savings)   89.35  0.94  ) 1 ( I  
LSEXTNY    (external savings   \ 
aid) 
100.84 0.20  ) 1 ( I  
LSNATY        (aid)   95.64  0.89  ) 1 ( I  
LINVY           (investment)  110.70 0.62  ) 1 ( I  
LRER            (real exchange rate)   60.00  0.33  ) 1 ( I  
Note: the first differences of the series are stationary (results not reported). The Fisher statistic is distributed as  2 χ with 
2 N ×  degrees of freedom, where N is the number of countries in the panel. 37 
 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5. Results of Kao’s panel cointegration test 
Kao residual cointegration 
test 
t-statistic  p-value 
DF*-statistics -2.97***    0.00 
Note: H0: The variables of interest are not cointegrated ; H1: The variables of interest are cointegrated (Kao, 1999). 
Kao’s cointegration test is based on a fixed effects models (our model of choice) which Pedroni does not discuss. *** 
indicate a rejection of the null of no cointegration at the 1% level. All test statistics are asymptotically normally 






























Note: H0: The variables of interest are not cointegrated ; H1: The variables of interest are cointegrated . Lag length 
selection was automatic based on SIC with lags from 0 to 9 (Pedroni, 1999, 2004). 
 
 
Table A7. Results of  Johansen’s panel cointegration test 
 
Johansen’s cointegrating test  Trace test statistic  p-value 
 106.18  0.02*** 
   
Note: H0: The variables of interest are not cointegrated  (no cointegration);  1 H : One cointegrating vector can be 




Estimated error terms are obtained by estimating Eq. (14) via DOLS in a first step. The extent of 
autocorrelation of the disturbances ρ  is then estimated via DOLS in a second step:   
it it it u u ε ρ + ⋅ = −1  leading to ρ ˆ . The third step involves the transformation of the variables (see 
below). Note, that the transformation of the variables is driven by ρ ˆ , the estimated coefficient of 
autocorrelation of the disturbances. This transformation leads to new variables in soft first 
differences (characterized by 
*) and a new error term  * u  that is uncorrelated to the error term of the 
previous period.
22 
1 ˆ * − ⋅ − = it it it u u u ρ  
1
* ˆ − ⋅ − = it it it LRYPOP LRYPOP LRYPOP ρ ; 
1
* ˆ − ⋅ − = it it it LPOPGPLUS LPOPGPLUS LPOPGPLUS ρ ;
1
* ˆ − ⋅ − = it it it LSDOMY LSDOMY LSDOMY ρ ; 
1
* ˆ − ⋅ − = it it it LSEXTNY LSEXTNY LSEXTNY ρ ; 
1
* ˆ − ⋅ − = it it it LSNATY LSNATY LSNATY ρ ; 
 























m it im m i i
it it it it j it
u LSNATY LSEXTNY
LSDOMY LPOPGPLUS
LSNATY LSEXTNY LSDOMY LPOPGPLUS LRYPOPX
+ ∆ + ∆ +
∆ + ∆ +











χ χ χ χ α
 
                                                                                                                                                (15*) 
 
                                                 
22 In our case only first order autocorrelation was detected. However, also higher orders of autocorrelation reaching 
back two or more periods could be modeled.  